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Abstract 
On 20 August 1947, the United States Military Tribunal condemned sixteen persons in 
Nuremberg for crimes committed in the name of science in several concentration camps. 
Moving away from a dichotomous stance delineating true science/false science, the judges 
were able to outline ten ethical and legal principles to regulate all clinical experiments, which 
were subsequently known as the “Nuremberg Code”. Where most of legal commentaries 
focus on the mere reading of these ten principles, this paper will highlight some of the steps in 
the legal journey of the American judges. We will see that, unfortunately, they have failed to 
address one of the most difficult issues in clinical trials and human experimentation: the 
almost unavoidable context of exploitation of any situation where a person is used as an 
object for the good of others. 
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It has now been seventy years since a United States military tribunal tried twenty-three people 
in Nuremberg, including twenty doctors and medical researchers,
1
 for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. They were accused of having constituted a collection of skeletons, 
implementing the T4 euthanasia program and having carried out medical experiments
2
 on 
prisoners in the concentration camps at Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, Natzweiler, 
Ravensbrück and Sachsenhausen between September 1939 and April 1945 – the period over 
which the tribunal had jurisdiction. Of the twenty-three defendants, seven were acquitted, 
seven sentenced to death
3
 and the others given prison sentences of at least ten years.
4
 
This trial (Karl Brandt and others)
5
 was set up by the authority responsible for the American 
Zone of Occupation, the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), which in 
                                                 
1
 Among the doctors and medical researchers were Karl Brandt (Hitler’s personal doctor), Siegfried Handloser 
(Chief of German Armed Forces Medical Service), Paul Rostock (Chief of the Office for Medical Science and 
Research), Oskar Schroeder (Chief of German Air Force Medical Service), Karl Genzken (Chief of Waffen SS 
Medical Service) and Karl Gebhardt (Heinrich Himmler’s personal doctor and President of the German Red 
Cross). 
2
 High altitude experiments, freezing experiments, malaria experiments, mustard gas experiments, sulfonamide 
experiments, bone transplantation and bone muscle and nerve regeneration experiments, sea water experiments, 
jaundice experiments, sterilization experiments, typhus experiments, poison experiments, phosphorus burns 
experiments.  
3
 Namely Viktor Brack, Karl Brandt, Rudolf Brandt, Karl Gebhardt, Waldemar Hoven, Joachim Mrugowsky, 
and Wolfram Sievers. 
4
 For an accurate analysis of this trial, cf. Yves Ternon, ‘Le procès des médecins. Actualisation’, 160 Revue 
d’histoire de la Shoah (1997) pp. 10-30. 
5
 United States of America vs. Karl Brandt and al. (case n°1), 20 August 1947, United States Military Tribunal. 
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October 1946 created the United States Military Tribunal.
6
 It was the first of the trials carried 
out under article 6 of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945
7
 and Law no. 10 issued by the 
Allied Control Council on 20 December 1945.
8
 The trial began on 9 December 1946, coming 
to an end less than a year later, with pronouncement of the verdicts and sentences respectively 
on 19 and 20 August 1947. 
Two years after the end of this trial, twelve former members of the Japanese armed forces, 
including six members of Unit 731
9
 and two members of Unit 100,
10
 were tried in the USSR. 
This one is far less well-known than its American counterpart,
11
 taking place from 25-30 
December 1949 in the city of Khabarovsk.
12
 According to the indictment of 16 December 
1949 drawn up by Prosecutor Berezovsky,
13
 the defendants were accused of having tested 
biological weapons on Russian and Chinese prisoners. The indictment thus mentions 
biological weapons tests which aimed at spreading different diseases and bacteriological 
agents such as typhoid fever, the plague, cholera or tuberculosis.
14
 It also mentions 
experiments conducted on women to test ways of treating syphilis as well as experimental 
treatment for limbs, which incurred their previous freezing. One defendant, Kawashima 
Kiyochi, stated during the trial that at least 600 people died every year due to the experiments 
carried out within Unit 731.
15
 According to Matsumura Tomokatsu’s testimony, these 
experiments on humans were given the green light by the Commander-in-Chief Kenkichi 
Ueda, and by his successor Yoshijirō Umezu.16 All the defendants pleaded guilty and were 
given sentences ranging from 3 to 25 years in a labour camp.  
Conversely, the Nuremberg defendants did not plead guilty, and this is in large part due to the 
defense’s argument, which sought to draw a parallel between the experiments carried out in 
Nazi Germany, and those which were being performed everywhere else in the world, 
                                                 
6
 USA, OMGUS, Ordinance n°7. Organization and powers of certain military tribunals, 18 October 1946.  
7
 London Agreement, 8 August 1945, reproduced in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal, Volume I: Official Documents (International Military Tribunal Secretariat, 1947), pp. 8-19. 
8
 Allied Control Council, Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes 
Against Peace and Against Humanity, 20 December 1945, especially Article 3 recognizing the right of each 
occupying authority to undertake proceedings against people accused of the crimes in question. 
9
 Unit 731, otherwise known as the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung 
Army (a group of the Japanese Imperial Army established in Kwantung) was founded in 1936 by a secret decree 
issued by Emperor Hirohito, according to Kawashima Kiyoshi’s testimony. It was directed by Ishii Shiro and 
stationed in Pingfang, one of the districts of Harbin, in the puppet state of Manchukuo. Many prisoners of war 
were used there as guinea pigs for experiments, particularly on the plague and cholera. Cf. Daniel Barenblatt, A 
Plague Upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation (HarperCollins, New 
York, 2004). 
10
 Unit 100, otherwise known as the Kwantung Army Warhorse Disease Prevention Shop was stationed in 
Mokotan, a village close to the city of Changchun in the state of Manchukuo. It was directed by Yujiro 
Wakamatsu. It was supposed to work on animal diseases, but experiments on humans were also carried out there. 
11
 Jing-Bao Nie,‘The West's Dismissal of the Khabarovsk Trial as “Communist Propaganda”. Ideology, evidence 
and international bioethics’, 1(1) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (2004) 32-42. 
12
 This trial took place on the basis of the decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on 19 April 
1943, relating to war crimes committed during the Second World War and defining manufacture and use of 
biological weapons as a war crime. Cf. Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army 
Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
Moscow, 1950). For further elements on medical crimes committed by Japanese doctors and on the Khabarovsk 
trial, cf. Jing-Bao Nie, Nanyan Guo, Mark Selden, Arthur Kleinman (eds.), Japan’s Wartime Medical Atrocities. 
Comparative inquiries in science, history and ethics (Routledge, New York, 2010), particularly the article by 
Boris G. Yudin, ‘Research on humans at the Khabarovsk War Crimes Trial: a historical and ethical 
examination’, pp. 59-78. 
13
 Materials on the Trial, supra note 12, p. 15 ss. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid., p. 20. 
16
 Ibid., p. 138. 
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particularly in the United States.
17
 It should not be forgotten that even as the Nuremberg trial 
was going on, American researchers continued infecting African-Americans in Tuskegee with 
syphilis,
18
 and more than 1300 Guatemalan prisoners – without their consent – with the same 
disease in addition to gonorrhoea and chancroid to subsequently study how they progressed, 
with or without treatment.
19
   
The Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial is thus located at a crossroads where three types of issues 
intersect: military ones, scientific ones and ideological ones. Military ones because this trial 
was related to all of the other trials aimed at prosecuting war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed by the Nazi state during the Second World War. Scientific ones because 
the trial was specifically aimed at acts carried out during this period by German researchers 
and doctors on people who were treated as mere guinea pigs. And lastly ideological ones 
because the courtroom was the theatre of a confrontation between two conflicting visions: on 
the one hand, a relativistic and totalitarian vision which asserted the supremacy of the social 
body over the individual
20
 and on the other a universalist and liberal vision which contended 
that it was the individual who had precedence over society.
21
  
In his opening statement, Prosecutor Telford Taylor appeared to mainly focus on the latter 
issues to pinpoint the reasons and the motives which led to the dehumanization of the 
victims.
22
 He thus pointed to the “prostitution”23  of doctors and medical science to Nazi 
ideology. However, whereas for him the crime was almost biomedical,
24
 “committed in the 
                                                 
17
 Cf. notably Jon M. Harkness, ‘Nuremberg and the issue of wartime experiments on US prisoners. The Green 
Committee’, 276(20) JAMA (1996) p. 1674. 
18
 Since 1932, the United States Public Health Service had been carrying out a study on syphilis using African-
American individuals, who were suffering from the disease and not receiving treatment, in order to determine the 
natural progression of the disease without any medication acting upon it. This study only came to an end in 1972 
when it was uncovered to the public by Jean Heller, ‘Syphilis Victims in U.S. Study Went Untreated for 40 
Years’, New York Times, 26 July 1972. Concerning this affair, cf. among others James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The 
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (The Free Press, New York, 1981); Susan M. Reverby, Examining Tuskegee: The 
Infamous Syphilis Study and its Legacy (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2009). Other similar 
studies were carried out in Sweden between 1891 and 1955, cf. L. W. Harrison, ‘The Oslo study of untreated 
syphilis’, 32 British Journal of Venereal Diseases (1956) 70-78 (the author cites the ‘Alabama group’). 
19
 This last test was carried out between 1946 and 1948 and was only revealed to the public in 2010. Cf. U.S. 
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Ethically impossible: STD research in Guatemala 
from 1946 to 1948, 2011; Susan M. Reverby, ‘Ethical Failures and History Lessons: The U.S. Public Health 
Service Research Studies in Tuskegee and Guatemala’, 34(1) Public Health Reviews (2012) 1-18. 
20
 Cf. notably Robert N. Proctor, ‘Nazi Doctors, Racial Medicine, and Human Experimentation’, in George J. 
Annas, Michael A. Grodin (eds.), The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code. Human Rights in Human 
Experimentation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 17-31; Jean-Pierre Baud, ‘Genèse institutionnelle 
du génocide’, in Josiane Olff-Nathan (ed.), La science sous le Troisième Reich (Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1993), 
pp. 177-195; Robert N. Proctor, ‘Nazi medical ethics: ordinary Doctors?’, Military Medical Ethics, vol. 2 (Office 
of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, United States of America, 2003), pp. 403-436 
21
 Cf. notably François De Smet, Les Droits de l'homme. Origines et aléas d'une idéologie moderne (Cerf, Paris, 
2001); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2010); 
Olivier Barsalou, La diplomatie de l'universel: la guerre froide, les Etats-Unis et la genèse de la Déclaration 
universelle des droits de l’Homme, 1945-1948 (Bruylant, Brussels, 2012); Michael Robert Marrus, ‘The 
Nuremberg Doctors' Trial in Historical Context’, 73(1) Bulletin of the History of Medicine (1999) 106-123; Ruth 
Macklin, ‘Universality of the Nuremberg Code’, in George J. Annas, Michael A. Grodin (eds.), The Nazi 
Doctors and the Nuremberg Code. Human Rights in Human Experimentation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1992), pp. 240-257. 
22
 Telford Taylor, ‘Opening statement of the prosecution, December 9, 1946’, Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law n°10, vol. I: ‘The Medical Case’, Nuernberg, October 
1946 – April 1949 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1950), pp. 27-28. 
23
 Ibid., pp. 56 and 58. 
24
 With reference to the work by Marcela Iacub, Le crime était presque sexuel et autres essais de casuistique 
juridique (Epel, Paris, 2002). 
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name of medical science”25 yet without being scientific,26 the developments of the trial would 
lead the court to take a different stance. Thinking in terms of the three types of issues listed 
above – military, scientific and ideological – the judges would define rules for a system of 
protection of bodily integrity for people regarding experiments on human beings. Moving 
away from a dichotomous stance delineating true science/false science, they were able to 
outline ten ethical and legal principles to regulate all clinical experiments,
27
 which were 
subsequently known as the “Nuremberg Code”.  
Where most legal commentaries thus focus on the mere reading of these ten principles, some 
authors even writing on the “lost truth of the Nuremberg Code”,28 I would like to highlight 
some of the steps in the legal journey of the American judges. Starting from the Martens 
Clause, they tried to find their path through international medical ethics. Unfortunately, they 
failed to address one of the most difficult issues in clinical trials and human experimentation: 
the almost unavoidable context of exploitation of any situation where a person is used as an 
object for the good of others. 
 
 
1. Nuremberg and a Minimum Level of Humanity 
 
For the judges at the Doctors’ Trial, the medical and scientific experiments carried out by the 
Nazi doctors, 
 
involving brutalities, tortures, disabling injury, and death were performed in complete disregard of 
international conventions, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as 
derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, and Control Council Law No. 10. Manifestly 
human experiments under such conditions are contrary to “the principles of the law of nations as 
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, 
and from the dictates of public conscience”.29 
 
Although they did not directly quote it, the formulation placed into quotation marks by the 
judges is a restatement of the final words of the Martens Clause. Also quoted, but this time 
explicitly, in the Krupp judgment
30
, this clause would – according to Theodor Meron – 
                                                 
25
 Taylor, supra note 22, p. 27. 
26
 Ibid., p. 61: ‘Many of these were experiments in name only; we will show them to have been senseless and 
clumsy and of no real value to medicine as a healing art’. The question of scientific quality as an ethical and/or 
legal criterion will be explored in the second part of the article. 
27
 Cf. notably: Philippe Amiel, François Vialla, ‘La vérité perdue du "code de Nuremberg": réception et 
déformations du "code de Nuremberg" en France’, 2009(4) Revue de droit sanitaire et social (2009) 673-687 ; 
George J. Annas, Michael A. Grodin (eds.), The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code, Oxford University 
Press, 1992; Paul Weindling, ‘Le Code de Nuremberg, Andrew Conway Ivy et les crimes de guerre médicaux 
nazis’, in Christian Bonah, Etienne Lepicard, Volker Roelcke (eds.), La médecine expérimentale au tribunal. 
Implications éthiques de quelques procès médicaux au XXe siècle europée (Edition des archives contemporaines, 
Paris, 2003), pp. 185-213. 
28
 Amiel and Vialla, ibid., pp. 673-687. 
29
 ‘Judgment’, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law 
n°10, vol. II: ‘The Medical Case’ - continued, Nuernberg, October 1946 – April 1949 (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, 1950), p. 183 [emphasis added]. 
30
 US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, US v. Alfried Krupp et al., ‘Judgement’, vol. IX, ‘Krupp Case’, p. 1341. 
The American judges were able to assert in this affair that the Martens Clause as stated in the Preamble to the 
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provide a response to assertions that the Nuremberg Charter merely constituted retroactive 
penal legislation.
31
 In 1899, the contracting Parties to the Hague Convention (II) on the Laws 
and Customs of Wars on Land agreed that for all cases not specifically covered by the 
provisions of the Convention, ‘populations and belligerents remain under the protection and 
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established 
between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public 
conscience’.32 Repeated in the Preamble to the Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land (1907)
33
, the Martens Clause
34
 affirms a minimum of humanity, 
these ‘elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war’ 
according to the formula of the International Court of Justice.
35
 It sets down the minimum 
requirement level of humanity in situations for which no other rule has been stipulated. It is a 
normative minimum below which any act against a person is illegal, and below which no 
necessity can become law. 
In foundational and legal terms, the rules of war revolve around the notion of military 
necessity and the framework for this.
 36
 Indeed, the notion and its framework is the raison 
d’être for the normative base. The preamble to the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 11 
December 1868 provides an interesting example in that it affirms ‘the necessities of war ought 
to yield to the requirements of humanity’.37 In order to be justified, an act committed in the 
context of an armed conflict must reconcile military necessity with obligations in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                        
1907 Convention, ‘is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, making the usages established 
among civilized nations, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience into the legal yardstick to be 
applied if and when the specific provisions of the Convention and the Regulations annexed to it do not cover 
specific cases occurring in warfare, or concomitant to warfare’. A citation notably underlined by Judge 
Shahabuddeen in his dissenting opinion at the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, 
International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion, p. 407. 
31
 ‘In Nuremberg, the Martens clause was invoked mainly in response to assertions that the Nuremberg Charter, 
as applied by the tribunals, constituted retroactive penal legislation’. It was necessary to show that the 
incriminations as laid out by the statutes of the Nuremberg IMT Nuremberg, or in the shape of Law No. 10 of 
the Allied Control Council, were, in reality, simply the formalization of earlier laws and customs and which were 
not actually new penal provisions applied retroactively. See Theodor Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of 
Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience’, 94(1) The American Journal of International Law (2000), p. 80. 
32
 Convention (II) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Preamble, al. 8. 
33
 Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Preamble, al. 8. 
34
 The clause derived from a statement by Professor Frédéric de Martens, made in reaction to the inability of the 
delegates at the 1899 Conference to come to an agreement on the status of civilians who take up arms against an 
occupying power. For the developments surrounding this clause, its history and its impact, cf. notably Antonio 
Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky ?’, 11(1) European Journal of International 
Law (2000) 187-216; Meron, supra note 31, pp. 78-89 ; Rupert Ticehurst, ‘The Martens Clause and the Laws of 
Armed Conflict’, 317 International Review of the Red Cross (1997), p. 824. Mika Nishimura Hayashi, ‘The 
Martens Clause and Military Necessity’, in Howard M. Hensel (ed.), The legitimate Use of Military Force 
(Routledge, New York, 2013), pp. 135-160. 
35
 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 9 April 1949, International Court of Justice, ICJ Reports 
1949, p. 22. 
36
 On the notion of military necessity, cf. notably Nobuo Hayashi, ‘Requirements of Military Necessity in 
International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law’, 28 Boston University International Law 
Journal (2010) 39-140; Nils Melzer, ‘Keeping the balance between military necessity and humanity: a response 
to four critiques of the ICRC’s interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities’, 42 
International Law and Politics (2010) 831-916. 
37
 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, 11 
December 1868, in International Law Institute Yearbook, 1877, vol. I, pp. 306-307. The signatories of this 
Declaration thus proposed to ban use of ‘any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes, which is either 
explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances’. 
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humanity.
38
 The first problem which was raised at Nuremberg was not so much knowing 
whether military necessity could be used as an excuse for any experiments on human subjects 
but defining to what extent, in an armed conflict, the notions of military necessity – both in 
terms of what it allowed as well as what it restricted – and the requirements of humanity 
could be used to regulate conducting tests on human beings in the absence of a specific 
applicable rule. 
Under questioning, Karl Brandt
39
 thus underlined that experiments with mustard gas had been 
carried out by all supposedly civilized nations since the First World War.
40
 The United 
Kingdom was, it seems, at the forefront in terms of experiments on humans.
41
 According to 
Brandt, the need for scientific research was then recognized by all nations as a military 
necessity,
42
 and such research was carried out under the auspices and the control of the state.
43
 
It was with this in mind that the defendants and their lawyers would seek to justify the 
experiments carried out as being for reasons of military necessity, namely, everything 
‘essential to the fatherland’s war effort’.44 They also underlined that this necessity is one of 
the conditions for the legality of experiments on humans,
45
 and that these experiments should 
not be conducted beyond what was necessary to ensure the resolution of the problem at 
hand.
46
 By employing these arguments, they made use of the two facets of necessity: 
permissive – doing what is necessary – and restrictive – only doing what is necessary.47 
                                                 
38
 Initially, the now somewhat antiquated idea of chivalry was coupled to these two founding principles of the 
laws on armed conflict. Cf. notably Lassa F. L. Oppenheim, International Law, Volume II, Disputes, War and 
Neutrality, 7
th
 edition (Longmans and Green, London, 1952), pp. 226-227. 
39
 Hitler’s personal doctor since 1934, Karl Brandt was lieutenant general of the Waffen-SS and Reich 
Commissioner for Health and Public Hygiene. He notably took charge of the program of euthanasia for disabled 
and mentally ill people, called ‘Aktion T4’. For a critical biography of this Nazi doctor, reference can be made to 
Ulf Schmidt, Karl Brandt: the Nazi Doctor. Medicine and Power in the Third Reich (Hambledon continuum, 
London, 2007). 
40
 Cf. notably Susan L. Smith, ‘Mustard Gas and American Race- Based Human Experimentation in World War 
II’, 36(3) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (2008) 517-521; Hugh R. Slotten, ‘Humane Chemistry or Scientific 
Barbarism? American Responses to World War I Poison Gas, 1915-1930’, 77(2) The Journal of American 
History (1990) 476-498. 
41
 Cf. in this respect Marion Girard, A Strange and Formidable Weapon: British Responses to World War I 
Poison Gas (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2008). 
42
 ‘Extract from the closing brief for defendant Karl Brandt’, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg 
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law n°10, vol. I: ‘The Medical Case’, Nuernberg, October 1946 – 
April 1949 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1950), p. 325. 
43
 In terms of the Nazi state, Yves Ternon underlines that ‘These experiments had often been planned in Berlin 
during conferences which brought together dozens of officials responsible for health services and during which 
the opportunity of carrying out experimental research had been discussed according to the necessities arising 
from the war’, cf. Ternon, supra note 4, p. 17. Cf. also Robert N. Proctor, ‘Nazi Doctors, Racial Medecine, and 
Human Experimentation’, in George J. Annas, Michael A. Grodin (ed.), The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg 
Code. Human Rights in Human Experimentation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 17-31. 
44
 ‘Extracts from the closing brief for defendant Ruff’, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military 
Tribunals Under Control Council Law n°10, vol. I: ‘The Medical Case’, Nuernberg, October 1946 – April 1949, 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1950), p. 124 ; cf. also ibid., p. 542 (Mrugowsky’s defense); 
ibid, vol. II: ‘The Medical Case’ - continued, pp. 5 s. (Gebhardt’s defense). 
45
 ‘Ruff’, Ibid., p. 124. 
46
 Ibid., p. 125. 
47
 Since the Lieber code, military necessity has been held to be ‘the necessity of those measures which are 
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modem law and usages of 
war’ (art. 14). Stated thus, this concept has a double purpose, both qualifying acts which are subject to the laws 
of war (art. 15) and excluding those which cause needles suffering with regard to the aims of the war (art. 16). It 
thereby has a permissive role – authorizing in time of war acts which are otherwise forbidden – and a restrictive 
role – forbidding unnecessary and needless harm. Cf. Lieber Code, 24 April 1863 (Instructions for the 
Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, written by Francis Lieber during the American Civil 
War and enacted by President Lincoln under the name of ‘General Order No. 100’). On the Lieber code and the 
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Dr Serviatus, Karl Brandt’s lawyer, pushed this line of thought to the furthest limit when he 
presented the prosecution and the judges with the use of the maxim of ‘necessity in war’, 
which, according to him, was accepted when it applied to the Allies but not when it applied to 
the Nazis.
48
 Deriving from German doctrine, this maxim of ‘Kriegsraison geht vor 
Kriegsmanier’49 seeks to assert, as Lassa F. L. Oppenheim explains, that ‘the laws of war lose 
their binding force in case of extreme necessity’50, i.e. in case of extreme danger or when you 
can defeat the enemy. This means that it would be possible to derogate the already derogating 
restrictions from ordinary law.
51
 Dr. Serviatus thus put the question of the American use of 
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima to the court. Why in this case, he asked, could military 
necessity be used as a reason to violate the ‘prohibition of the Hague Convention, under 
which belligerents have no unlimited right in the choice of methods for inflicting damage on 
the enemy’52, and yet not in the case of experiments carried out in the camps? Whether it be 
necessity in war or military necessity, the aim of this line of argument is to secure that states 
can always decide to override ordinary law, in a highly Schmittian vision of sovereignty.
53
 
And, the supreme imperative that can be derived would apply to the medical field, just as it 
would to any other. 
Faced with this argument, the prosecution countered that no necessity, military or not
54
, could 
be used to justify the acts carried out by the Nazi doctors. Although it acknowledged that the 
Nazi state may have viewed these experiments as being necessary and that ‘each defendant 
thought there was some necessity to what he was doing’, 55  the prosecution posited that 
accepting this necessity of the state
56
 as a means of defending the actions in question would 
result in the trial losing all sense or meaning.
57
 Yet by doing so, the prosecution aimed at the 
wrong target and appears to have confused the notions of Kriegsraison and military necessity. 
The former was only really used by Brandt’s lawyer in a provocative way as a means of 
forcing the American judges to face up to their own contradictions. Correctly rejecting any 
                                                                                                                                                        
principle of military necessity, interesting insight is provided by Burrus M. Carnaha, ‘Lincoln, Lieber and the 
Laws of War: the Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity’, 92 AJIL (1998) 213-231. 
48
 ‘Final plea for defendant Karl Brandt by Dr. Servatius’, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg 
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law n°10, vol. II: ‘The Medical Case’ (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, 1950), p. 127. 
49
 ‘Necessity in war overrides the way of fighting a war' [personal translation]. For a succinct historical overview 
of this notion, cf. Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010), pp. 265-268. 
50
 Lassa F. L. Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, vol. II: War and Neutrality, Longmans/Green, 1906, 
p. 79. 
51
 For Professor Oppenheim, only the conventions of war and not the laws and customs of war can be ignored in 
such a case, Ibid. 
52
 ‘Final plea for defendant Karl Brandt by Dr. Servatius’, supra note 48, p. 127. 
53
 According to this author, a member of the Nazi party from 1933 until 1936: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception’, cf. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, (1922, reissue Gallimard, Paris 1988), p. 15. 
54
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exceptions based on Kriegsraison
58
 does not therefore have to mean that the entire notion of 
military necessity also has to be dismissed out of hand.  
By reaching the judgment that the experiments carried out by the Nazi doctors were, at the 
very least, contrary to the general principles of criminal law and Allied Control Council Law 
No. 10 but also more generally against international custom as set out by the Martens 
Clause
59, the court responded to the defense’s use of the necessity argument to justify the 
experiments carried out. The judges emphasised that the reconciliation of military necessity 
with the requirements of humanity must be carried out within the framework of the laws and 
customs of war and that the result of this reconciliation cannot call into question ‘[the] laws of 
humanity and [the] requirements of the public conscience’60. This means that a universally 
approved minimum level of humanity exists which no sovereignty has the right to override, 
between jus cogens and erga omnes norms. 
 
 
2. International Medical Ethics as a Source of Law 
 
Reaching a verdict about the doctors therefore required a level of basic humanity to be 
established within the bounds of the ‘moral, ethical and legal concepts’ 61  applicable to 
experiments on human beings. Set out over two pages of the verdict,
62
 the ten principles 
governing medical research on humans, the Nuremberg Code,
63
 thus established a boundary 
between ‘permissible medical experiments’64  and those which must be condemned at all 
times. The judges drew these principles from the debates between the respective parties 
involved in the trial about the practices generally accepted in experimental medicine 
throughout the world. 
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Both the defense and the prosecution appeared to agree that medical ethical norms could be 
used to interpret the legal framework applicable to this case. Thus, in view of the absence of a 
specific international rule targeting experimentation on humans, whether in time of war or of 
peace, the defense lawyers first of all reminded the tribunal of the necessary positivity of the 
rules applicable to the trial of their clients.
65
 Gebhardt’s lawyer quite appositely insisted on 
the relationship between medical ethics and the law. He reminded the tribunal that any 
violation of medical ethics couldn’t automatically be viewed as a crime; only the law can 
provide grounds for criminal charges.
66
 He put it to the tribunal that, in contrast, the principles 
of medical ethics are important elements regarding interpretation of the law in this field.
67
 On 
the opposite side – indeed from the very start of the trial – the prosecution stressed the 
Hippocratic Oath
68
 as the basis for research ethics regarding humans, accusing the Nazi 
doctors of having violated the Oath they had sworn to uphold, particularly with regard to the 
principle of doing no harm.
69
 The trial then saw the main arguments focus on the definition of 
the code of ethics applicable to the interpretation of ‘elementary considerations of humanity’. 
For Dr. Ivy, one of the American experts involved in the trial, the Hippocratic Oath was the 
‘golden rule’, 70  the law of reciprocity as applied to the field of medicine, 71  namely a 
‘fundamental basic truth that is good for all time’.72 But he was not always entirely clear 
about the scope of the Oath. When cross examined by Dr. Tipp, one of the defense 
counsellors, on the subject of potentially fatal experiments carried out on prisoners who were 
condemned to death and who had volunteered for the experiments,
73
 he replied that the 
passage of the Oath forbidding the administration of a poison to a patient, even with their 
agreement, ‘refers to the function of the physician as a therapist, not as experimentalist’.74 
This would make the Oath a ‘two-tier system’ with certain passages not applying to medical 
science researchers. According to Michael Grodin, both Andrew Ivy and Leo Alexander, 
another American expert who shared the same point of view, ‘confused therapeutic treatment 
of patients with nontherapeutic experimentation on prisoners and thus incorrectly cited 
Hippocrates as the source for the ethics of human experimentation’.75 This is supported by the 
fact that the Hippocratic Oath does not at any point mention the question of consent, which 
was very much a central one at Nuremberg. It does however set the requirement that treatment 
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be beneficial to patients, which appears difficult to square with experiments which produce no 
direct therapeutic benefits – traditionally Phase I clinical trials76. 
To back up his expertise, Andrew Ivy also called upon the research directives of the American 
Medical Association.
77
 Still it must be borne in mind that these directives were only published 
nineteen days before the start of the trial following a very short reflection period which began 
at the end of 1946.
78
 Dr. Sauter (the lawyer for Ruff and Romberg) also underlined this aspect 
when he stated that: 
 
[A] German physician who in Germany performed experiments on Germans cannot be judged 
exclusively according to an American medical opinion, which moreover dates from the year 1945 
and was coded in the years 1945 and 1946 for future use; it can also have no retroactive force.
79
 
 
Thus, given that the Hippocratic Oath was seen to apply more to medical treatment than to 
medical research and, furthermore, that the existing ethical directives applied more to 
America than on an international basis, the defense accentuated a form of practical and 
genuinely international ethical code as the basis for the framework governing experiments on 
humans. Ruff’s lawyer stressed that ‘the human experiment is such a far-reaching and often 
such an indispensable matter that one might speak of an unwritten law, which generally and 
tacitly is accepted and acknowledged by the whole world’.80 He concluded that in the absence 
of a written law, doctors or researchers could only adopt what is expressed in international – 
as opposed to solely American – medical literature as a conventional code of conduct.81 He 
thereby asserted the existence of a form of international ethics as a source of interpretation of 
general law or even as a source of legal custom. A similar point of view can be found in Karl 
Brandt’s defense. His lawyer used experiments generally carried out throughout the world, 
including in the United States, as a basis for his argument. Experiments for which the reports 
‘have so far been received without opposition by specialist circles, the authorities, and also 
the general public’,82 led him to assert that it is possible to deduce what is allowable and 
fair.
83
 Via a deduction worthy of sociological positivism,
84
 the lawyer concluded that it was 
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therefore possible to determine the legal rules applicable to the experiments.
85
 A similar 
argumentation was presented by Ruff’s lawyer, for whom one of the central questions of this 
trial was the comparison of practices carried out by the accused with those which were 
internationally recognized and used by foreign researchers ‘with the approval of all civilized 
humanity.
86
 
 
 
3. Consent to Human Experiments in a Coercive Context 
 
But during the exchanges, the only real comparison made between the various practices 
focused on the question of consent and elements regarding the scientific quality of the 
experiments only rarely came up,
87
 save to dismiss Nazi science a priori because it was 
inhumane.
88
 It is interesting to note that, as late as the mid-1980s, the question of using data 
from high altitude or hypothermia experiments carried out in concentration camps was still 
being raised. In an article published in 1984, Kristine Moe noted that since 1945 at least forty-
five scientific articles had cited data from Nazi experiments.
89
 She underlined that ‘[d]espite 
the conventional wisdom, many of the scientists I spoke to regard the Nazi data as useful and 
necessary to their work’. In a 1945 report, initially classified as top-secret, Leo Alexander 
concluded that the experiments on hypothermia had been carried out under reliable 
conditions,
90
 judging that ‘the final report by Holzlöhner, Rascher and Finke satisfies all the 
criteria of objective and accurate observation and interpretation.’ 91  This question of the 
scientific reliability of Nazi medical experiments continues to divide authors, with categorical 
detractors
92
 and observers who take a more balanced view.
93
 
In terms of consent, the defense lawyers sought to establish the crimes of Nazi researchers as 
the continuation of experiments carried out elsewhere in the world since the beginning of the 
20
th
 century. They for instance recalled the experiments conducted in 1912 by Colonel Strong 
and Dr. Crowell on beriberi in Manila, Philippines, using prisoners condemned to death and 
presented as volunteers; those carried out on ‘voluntary’ prisoners in 1920 by Dr. Joseph 
Goldberger (Pellagra experiments) or since 1942 on malaria at Statesville Penitentiary, 
Illinois, under the direction of the University of Chicago; or the experiments on trench fever 
in 1917, using American soldiers, by a committee under the supervision of the Surgeon 
                                                 
85
 Extract from the closing brief for defendant Karl Brandt’, supra note 42, p. 50: ‘The experiments actually 
carried out are a mirror of the existing laws and one can by way of legal sociological investigation find the 
norms of law that have validity’ [emphasis added]. 
86
 ‘Extract from the closing brief for defendant Ruff’, supra note 44, p. 93. 
87
 Cf. notably the cross-examination by Dr. Ivy, Transcripts, pp. 9101-9132. 
88
 Telford Taylor, ‘Opening statement…’, supra note 22. 
89
 Kristine Moe, ‘Should the Nazi Research Data Be Cited?’, 14(6) The Hastings Center Report (1984), p. 5. 
90
 Leo Alexander, Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee, The Treatment of Shock from Prolonged 
Exposure to Cold, Especially in Water, Item No. 24 (Office of the Publication Board, Department of Commerce, 
Washington, DC, 1946). 
91
 Ibid., p. 67 
92
 Cf. notably Robert L. Berger, ‘Nazi Science – The Dachau Hypothermia Experiments’, 20 The New England 
Journal of Medicine (1990) 1435-1440; William E. Seidelman, ‘Mengele Medicus: Medicine’s Nazi Heritage’, 2 
The Milbank Quarterly (1988) 221-239. 
93
 Cf. notably Arthur L. Caplan, ‘How Did Medicine Go So Wrong?’, in Arthur L. Caplan (ed.), When Medicine 
Went Mad. Bioethics and the Holocaust (Humana Press, New York, 1992), pp. 53-92; Robert N. Proctor, ‘Nazi 
Science and Nazi Medical Ethics: Some Myths and Misconceptions’, 43(3) Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine (2000) 335-346. 
Final draft version (do not cite). Final version published in International Criminal Law 
Review 17(6):1049-1069 05 Dec 2017 
General of the U.S. Army and the American Red Cross.
94
 All of these situations took place 
under highly coercive conditions, whether the coercion was structural or hierarchical in 
nature. As emphasized by Gebhardt’s lawyer, ‘in nearly all countries experiments have been 
performed on human beings under conditions which entirely exclude volunteering in a legal 
sense.’95 The voluntary nature of participation in the aforementioned experiments is highly 
questionable, and it could thus interrogate the affirmation, made by the accusation, of consent 
to take part in experiments as a universally recognized or accepted rule.  
The lawyers for Karl Brandt,
96
 Siegfried Ruff
97
 and Karl Gebhardt
98
 also asserted that certain 
experiments could be carried out on prisoners without their consent, as a means of atoning for 
their crimes. The only criterion would therefore be that of proportionality between the risk to 
prisoners and the crimes they had committed.
99
 Dr. Serviatus cited the case of experiments on 
prisoners who had been sentenced to death, such as the ones in Manila on 
tetrachloroethane,
100
 or prisoners convicted under ordinary law, such as the experiments on 
malaria in three American penitentiaries.
101
 He concluded that international medical doctrine 
allows in these cases for certain experiments to be carried out on prisoners even if criteria of 
consent or safety are not respected. On this point, the prosecution appeared to struggle to 
counter the defense’s arguments, only attacking them concerning the legitimacy of the 
application of the death penalty to these categories of prisoners, and implicitly underlining the 
absence of a clear international policy in the field of clinical trials. 
In view of this, the judges asserted in the first section of what is today known as the 
Nuremberg Code that: 
 
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.  
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so 
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of 
force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and 
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved 
as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires 
that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be 
made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by 
which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the 
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment. 
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The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual 
who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which 
may not be delegated to another with impunity »
102
. 
 
This extract from the verdict sets out a clear and precise basis for what would subsequently be 
called ‘clear and informed consent’ and it proved to be fundamental to future national and 
international standards in the biomedical field. The characteristics of such consent are that 
there should be no coercion of individuals, that the said individuals should be informed and 
that it should be ensured that they understand the information; in addition, repetition of this 
consent should be obtained by all researchers taking part in the clinical trials. However, 
despite its undoubted importance, this first principle, along with the ninth one concerning the 
right to withdraw consent at any stage, appears entirely disconnected from the contextual 
reality of experiments carried out during the period, in Germany or elsewhere. Whether they 
were carried out in prison, on socially disadvantaged and often illiterate sectors of the 
population, on medical students or on soldiers, these practices occur within contexts which 
are inherently coercive and under which it seems delusive to talk of free and informed 
consent. 
The other eight principles, aimed at defining what constitutes moral science, as well as quality 
science, thus look like an attempt to apply a respectable veneer justifying the liberty taken 
with regard to reality. The question is still valid today in the context of Phase I (no direct 
therapeutic benefits) clinical trials, notably with regard to the accusation that the poorest 
sectors of the population are being exploited to the benefit of the rest of the population. In the 
United States, Carl Elliot has for example studied cities like Austin and Philadelphia, where 
‘the drug-testing economy has produced a community of semi-professional research subjects, 
who enrol in one study after another. Some of them do nothing else. For them, “guinea-
pigging,” as they call it, has become a job’.103 Without going into the details of the intense 
debate which has been raging since the start of the 21
st
 century about the ideas of exploitation 
and undue inducement in biomedical research,
104
 it is interesting to recall that Dr. Serviatus, 
Karl Brandt’s lawyer, stated that in a naturally coercive context, validity of consent should be 
evaluated in terms of two criteria: knowledge of the risk involved and the advantages that the 
subjects think they will gain.
105
 According to the lawyer, subjects should be proportionally 
rewarded depending on the seriousness of the risks incurred. Thus a level of compensation 
which is too low in relation to the risks incurred would also denote an enforced experiment.
106
 
To back this up, he pointed to the experiments on pellagra carried out in 1915 by Joseph 
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Goldberger at Rankin State Prison, Mississippi (Pellagra experiments
107
), those on leprosy 
carried out on prisoners who had been condemned to death at Billibid Penitentiary, Manilla, 
Philippines,
108
 or the ones performed at San Quentin Penitentiary in San Quentin in 1946,
109
 
and for which no compensation was given to prisoners. According to Dr. Serviatus, therefore, 
only ‘if both basic conditions are fully met will it be possible for the prisoner to make a free 
decision’.110 
Although it would be counterproductive here to resort to reductio ad Hitlerum
111
 to discredit 
all arguments in favour of inducement to take part in clinical trials, this reference to the 
arguments raised in Nuremberg at least links the question of consent to the inherently 
coercive context of certain situations. As important and necessary as the Doctors’ Trial was, 
the American judges were unfortunately unable to bring about a departure from the traditional 
archetype of the decontextualized legal relationship.  
This aspect of the trial has, in large part, been overlooked since the Second World War. Due 
to their exceptionally inhumane nature,
112
 the facts of this trial have never really brought 
about any genuine reflection or consideration on the part of the medical profession or state 
institutions. And as Sophie Monnier emphasizes in her thesis, ‘the all-encompassing 
importance of corporatism’113 which predominated after this war led to all focus being placed 
on quality of science alone rather than on the potential violence of the contexts in which this 
activity can occur. 
 
 
                                                 
107
 Joseph Goldberger, W. F. Tanner, ‘A Study of the Treatment and Prevention of Pellagra. Experiments 
Showing the Value of Fresh Meat and of Milk, the Therapeutic Failure of Gelatin, and the Preventive Failure of 
Butter and of Cod-Liver Oil’, 39(3) Public Health Reports (1924) 87-107; for a critical analysis of the use of 
prisoners in this experimentation, Cf. Jon M. Harkness, ‘Prisoners and pellagra’, 111(5) Public Health Report 
(1996) 463-467. And more generally concerning experiments on prisoners in the U.S., Cf. his thesis: Jon M. 
Harkness, Research Behind Bars: A History of Nontherapeutic Research on American Prisoners (University of 
Wisconsin, 1996). 
108
 Paul F. Russell, ‘Biological and Medical Research at the Bureau of Science, Manila’, 10(2) The Quarterly 
Review of Biology (1935) 119-153. 
109
 ‘Extract from the Closing Brief For Defendant Karl Brandt’, supra note 42, p. 985; for a presentation of the 
experiment by its authors Cf. Lowell A. Rantz, Elizabeth Randall, Helen H. Rantz, ‘Immunization of human 
beings with group A hemolytic streptococci’, 6(4) The American Journal of Medicine (1949) 424-432. San 
Quentin Prison was, at the time, a center for human experiments under the direction of its head physician Dr. 
Leo L. Stanley. The latter had himself tested one technique for transplanting human testicles and another 
involving injection of a homogenate of rams’ testicles into volunteer prisoners between 1919 and 1920, cf. Leo 
L. Stanley, ‘Experiences in Testicle Transplantation’, 18(7) California State Journal Of Medicine (1920) 251-
253. Dr. Stanley’s research seems to be concomitant with that of the Franco-Russian surgeon Serge Voronoff, 
who carried out transplants of human testicles and especially monkey testicles in the 1920s Cf. notably Serge 
Voronoff, Greffes Testiculaires (Librairie Octave Doin, Paris, 1923). 
110
 ‘Extract from the Closing Brief For Defendant Karl Brandt’, supra note 42, p. 985. 
111
 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953), p. 42. 
112
 Cf. notably Norman Howard-Jones, ‘Human experimentation in historical and ethical perspectives’, 16 Social 
science and medicine law (1982), p. 1443; Robert N. Proctor, ‘Nazi Science and Nazi Medical Ethics: Some 
Myths and Misconceptions’, 43(3) Perspectives in Biology and Medicine (2000) 335-346. According to this 
author, the myth of Nazi ‘false science’, as notably recorded by the prosecution, ‘served to reassure the 
American public that abuses like those of the Nazi era could never occur in a liberal democracy. Nazi science 
was pseudo-science, science out-of-control; American science was genuine science, secure within democratic 
institutions, obedient to the rule of law. Post-war ethical codes of conduct could even be dismissed as 
unnecessary – after all, weren’t they designed to prevent abuses that could only occur in a totalitarian society,’ 
see Ibid., p. 336. 
113
 Sophie Monnier, Les Comités d’Ethique et le Droit. Eléments d’analyse sur le système normatif de la 
bioéthique (L’Harmattan, Paris, 2005) p. 79. 
